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Datum: 6 oktober 2014 
 
Advice: Article 13 of the proposed Dutch health insurance law: compatibility with European 
Union law 
 
A. THE REVISED DUTCH HEALTH CARE SYSTEM AND ARTICLE 13 
 
1. Article 13 of the proposed new Dutch health insurance law (Zorgverzekeringswet) 
provides that if patients go to a health care provider who does not have a contract with 
their insurer then the insurer is not obliged to reimburse their costs. This article is in 
the context of a revision of the Dutch health care system. It is envisaged that in the 
future insurers will select a limited number of health care providers and make large-
scale contracts with these. Clients of those insurers who have what is called a ‘natura’ 
policy (a benefits-in-kind policy) will then only be entitled to care from those 
contracted providers. Insurers would rather deal with a smaller number of providers, 
which each treat a larger number of patients. 
 
2. In practice, there will be few if any contracts with foreign health care providers, as the 
number of patients who wish to go abroad for treatment is generally low by 
comparison with those who wish to be treated in their own state. Foreign clinics may 
be attractive for some but will in general not be logical places to conclude bulk 
contracts with.  
 
3. Patients who wish to have greater freedom to choose their own healthcare may opt for 
a different kind of policy, a so-called restitution policy. This allows them to go to the 
provider of their choice and be reimbursed. It is however envisaged that only a small 
proportion of patients will choose for a restitution policy, as it will be more expensive.  
 
4. Patients with a benefits-in-kind policy, the majority of the Dutch population, will then 
not be able to go to foreign healthcare providers, except where there is a contract with 
that provider (which may occur for certain kinds of treatment, or in certain border 
areas, but will be the exception). If they do go to a foreign provider with whom there 
is no pre-arranged contract, the insurer is entitled, under Article 13, to refuse 
reimbursement. 




B. COMPATIBILITY WITH DIRECTIVE 2011/24 ON FREE MOVEMENT OF 
PATIENTS 
 
1. Article 7(1) of the directive provides that  
Without prejudice to Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and subject to the 
provisions of Articles 8 and 9, the Member State of affiliation shall ensure the 
costs incurred by an insured person who receives cross-border healthcare are 
reimbursed, if the healthcare in question is among the benefits to which the 
insured person is entitled in the Member State of affiliation. 
2. The Dutch minister responsible for health has expressed the view that this provision is 
more generous to states than the previous case law of the European Court of Justice.
2
 
She has suggested that if only contracted healthcare is reimbursed within the 
Netherlands then Article 7(1) merely imposes an obligation to reimburse contracted 
healthcare outside the Netherlands. So if a patient goes to a non-contracted foreign 
healthcare provider they have no right to reimbursement because ‘non-contracted 




This view is however completely without any basis in the law and appears to be based 
on a number of misunderstandings. 
 
The Directive codifies the case law 
 
3. The directive is not intended to change or restrict the case law of the Court. Rather it 
is intended to codify and clarify it. It is, as is very common in EU law, an exercise in 
translating judgments into clear written law. This is apparent from the directive itself. 
Recital 8 provides 
…This Directive is intended to achieve a more general, and also effective, 
application of principles developed by the Court of Justice on a case-by-case 
basis. 
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 This has also been considered by Prof. J.W. van de Gronden, in ‘Grensoverschrijdend patiëntenverkeer in de 
Zorgverzekeringswet: is de voorgenomen wijziging van artikel 13 Europeesrechtelijk houdbaar?’ Tijdschrift 
voor Gezondheidsrecht 2013 (37) 1. I am in agreement with his conclusions that the proposed change is 
unlawful. See paragraphs 30-41 of section B. 
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 See the letter to the ‘Tweede Kamer’ of 26
th
 March 2012, reference Z-3109656, subject ‘aanpassing artikel 13 
van de Zvw’; Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 362, nr. 3, p. 36. 
3 Ibid. 
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That suggests that the directive aims, if anything, to make the rights developed by the 
Court more effective, rather than to extend the circumstances in which a state may 
restrict them.  
Recital 10 provides 
This Directive aims….to ensure patient mobility in accordance with the 
principles established by the Court of Justice… 
There are numerous other provisions of the preamble which refer to the case law of 
the Court and make clear that the Directive is intended to implement this case law into 
legislation (paragraphs 11, 12, 26, 27, 38, 40, 43, 44). 
It is therefore not surprising that the Commission understands the directive to be a 
codification and clarification of the case law. This is apparent from its presentations 
of patient rights to the public on the Commission website,
4
 but is perhaps most 
directly put in its interpretative note on the directive and related legislation:
5
 
The Directive codifies a number of rulings of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union regarding the freedom of patients to seek medical services 
abroad and to be reimbursed for such services by their home Member State, 
and introduces a number of measures to facilitate the implementation of these 
rulings in practice. 
Indeed, this is the universal academic understanding of the Directive, as numerous 
publications attest,
6
 and one may expect it to be the understanding of the Member 
States given the preamble and the fact that the guidance note above was supplied to 
all those states.  
The starting point for reading this Directive is therefore that it codifies the case law, 
and enhances the effectiveness of the rights granted in that case law. Any suggestion 
that it is an attempt to restrict the case law of the Court is without basis in the text, and 
appears to be shared by no-one. 
Legal basis 
 
4. It is further important to note that the Directive is adopted partly under the Article 114 
competence for internal market harmonisation. That means that for it to be valid as 
legislation it must contribute to internal market goals, and in particular it must 
                                                      
4
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contribute to free movement.
7
 Legislation which merely protects public health, or has 
other admirable goals, but does not in fact remove obstacles to free movement may 




As a matter of law, therefore, the net outcome of this directive must be that patient 
mobility is enhanced. Where the Treaty grants free movement rights – as is the case 
for patients – a piece of secondary legislation which attempts to reduce those rights 
rather than to implement, enhance, or facilitate them would be invalid for lack of a 
legal base. 
 
It is then perfectly predictable that the Directive preamble, and Article 1, emphasise 
that its function is to facilitate access to cross-border health care. The Commission’s 
explanatory memorandum, attached to its initial proposal (and supplied to all Member 
States), explained in paragraph 4(a) (Legal Basis) that  
The Court’s rulings on the individual cases outlined above are clear in 
themselves, and no pre-condition may be required [my italics] for the exercise 
of the rights of patients recognised by the Court. However, it is necessary to 




There is a recognition here that rights found by the Court cannot be taken away. The 
directive does not, and cannot, restrict rights which the Court has found to be inherent 
in the Treaty. It simply implements them into written law. It cannot be the case that 
patient mobility becomes harder as a result of the Directive’s adoption. 
The text of Article 7 
5. Turning to the text of Article 7(1) itself it might be said to support two readings. The 
key phrase is ‘the benefits to which the ensured person is entitled in the Member State 
of affiliation…’ because these are the benefits to which they are entitled in other 
Member States too. The key question is then which are ‘the benefits’. How should this 
phrase be read where a benefits-in-kind policy is involved? Are the benefits 
‘healthcare from contracted suppliers’, as the minister would suggest? Or are the 
benefits ‘healthcare of the sort within the Dutch ‘basispakket’ of insured treatments’? 
Does ‘benefits’ refer to the kind of medical treatment, or to the contractual status of 
the supplier of that treatment? 
On a natural reading of the text it is more natural to read benefits are referring to the 
sort of treatment, rather than its contractual context. That would suggest that, contrary 
to the minister’s suggestion, the kinds of medical treatments for which the patient is 
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 Unless it is aimed at harmonising the conditions of competition, something not relevant to this directive. 
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 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the application of patients' rights in 
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insured in the Netherlands must also be reimbursed if supplied abroad (subject to later 
provisions of the directive, on which more below). The contractual context of a 
medical treatment is not really part of the ‘type of benefit’ which health insurance 
covered. 
Imagine a conversation between two Europeans, and the question to a Dutch citizen 
with a benefits-in-kind policy, ‘which benefits are you entitled to under the insurance 
in your country?’ Would the more appropriate answer be ‘care from contracted 
suppliers’ or ‘all necessary hospital and non-hospital treatment as listed in the basis-
pakket….’? Would a more normal answer be by reference to the contractual status of 
the supplier or to the kinds of medical processes which the Netherlands guarantees to 
its citizens? 
6. While this textual argument supports a reading of Article 7(1) which is incompatible 
with the minister’s view, reading legal texts out-of-context is always a weak basis for 
an opinion, and particularly where European Union law – which is notably policy-
based – is concerned. Yet if we examine the context, the suggested reading of the text 
is confirmed. 
 
7. Firstly, later provisions in Article 7 and 8 of the directive deal with procedural 
requirements and conditions for obtaining healthcare abroad, justified restrictions on 
patient’s rights, and derogations from the general principle of Article 7(1). This makes 
it rather nonsensical to incorporate the contractual conditions of the benefits-in-kind 
policy into the definition of ‘benefits’. Rather, the logic of the two articles appears to 
be that first we decide which kinds of treatments a Member State covers, then in 
principle a patient is entitled to receive those abroad, and then we move on to whether 
specific features of the national healthcare system justify a derogation.  
 
8. Secondly, this reading is supported by the fact that it is the one which most facilitates 
patient mobility, which most effectively implements the rights recognised by the 
Court in its case law, and is indeed closest to that case law. Given the discussions 
above it is almost beyond doubt that the directive should be read in the way suggested 
here, and will be so read by the Court. If the fact that a Member State chooses for a 
benefits-in-kind scheme is sufficient to exclude a right to foreign treatment wherever 
the foreign supplier is not contracted within that scheme, then all the case law of the 
Court is undone and the directive is largely useless in Member States with benefits-in-
kind schemes.  
 
9. The final confirmation of how Article 7(1) should be read comes from the precise 
wording of Article 7(1) itself. The phrase involved is not new in the directive, but 
almost cut-and-pasted from existing legislation and close to phrases used in 
judgments of the Court. Regulation 1408/71, now regulation 883/2004, is the other 
major piece of Union legislation on healthcare abroad. It allows patients an alternative 
regime to the Directive and Treaty rights. Instead of being treated abroad and 
receiving reimbursement, they can also, under certain circumstances of medical need, 
be treated abroad as if they were insured in that state, on the same terms as persons 
insured in that state. When do they have this right? If the treatment in question is 
‘among the benefits provided for by the legislation..’ of the home Member State.
10
  
Prior to the Court’s case law on patient mobility many Member States only provided 
medical care within their home system. Foreign health care was, one might say, not 
among the benefits provided by their domestic legislation. Yet this argument was 
never put forward to undermine the regulation. The ‘benefits’ provided by their home 
Member State was not understood to mean the benefits provided by the suppliers from 
which they were entitled to treatment, but the kinds of treatment – by reference to the 
sort of medical processes, not their contractual context. 
When a phrase is repeatedly used in different legislative acts, in the same field, it is 
likely that it will be given the same meaning. The established understanding of how 
home benefits are to be understood will also be that applied to Article 7(1). 
10. It is also worth noting the finding of the Court in Müller-Fauré, one of the leading 
judgments on patient mobility, and the one in which the Court first explicitly 
considered the Dutch benefits-in-kind system.
11
 In that case it stated, among other 
findings, that  
In any event, it should be borne in mind that it is for the Member States alone 
to determine the extent of the sickness cover available to insured persons, so 
that, when the insured go without prior authorisation to a Member State other 
than that in which their sickness fund is established to receive treatment there, 
they can claim reimbursement of the cost of the treatment given to them only 
within the limits of the cover provided by the sickness insurance scheme in the 
Member State of affiliation. (paragraph 98). 
The minister would presumably be in agreement with this, since she would take the 
view that it only entitles patients to treatment abroad where the foreign supplier has a 
contract with their insurer. However, that is not at all how the Court meant the phrase. 
It went on to decide in substance that despite the features of the Netherlands’ system, 
and the restriction of patients to contracted suppliers, there was an obligation to 
reimburse foreign care if that type of medical treatment was among the medical 
processes guaranteed to Dutch insured persons. Benefits are not defined by the 
contractual position of the supplier, but by their medical content. That is how the 
Court meant the phrase above, very close to Article 7(1), and it is how it will read 
Article 7(1). It is somewhat odd that Article 7(1) is argued to limit Müller-Fauré since 
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that is precisely the case which contradicts the minister’s understanding of ‘the 




11. A final note should be added on recital 33, which provides that  
This Directive does not aim to create an entitlement to reimbursement of the 
costs of healthcare provided in another Member State, if such healthcare is not 
among the benefits provided for by the legislation of the Member State of 
affiliation of the insured person. Equally, this Directive should not prevent the 
Member States from extending their benefits-in-kind scheme to healthcare 
provided in another Member State. This Directive should recognise that 
Member States are free to organise their healthcare and social security systems 
in such a way as to determine entitlement for treatment at a regional or local 
level. 
This rather unclear paragraph appears to preview Article 7(1) but then goes on to 
speak of the directive not preventing extensions of benefits-in-kind. That may appear 
to suggest that where a patient is covered by a benefits-in-kind scheme extension to 
foreign healthcare is at the discretion of the Member State.  
Despite the ambiguities in the paragraph, it cannot be understood in the sense above. 
If that were a proper understanding of the directive it would be a largely useless piece 
of legislation in many Member States, and indeed give Member States the option to 
effectively opt-out of patient mobility by adopting benefits-in-kind schemes. The 
latter part of the recital is not echoed in the directive text itself, and given all the other 
arguments above this one slightly unclear sentence is not enough to support a narrow 
view of patient rights.  
Rather, it appears more likely that the recital wishes to suggest that while patients 
have a right to reimbursement of foreign care, that should not be understood as 
meaning that states are precluded from having contractual relations with foreign 
suppliers and so bringing them within the national benefits-in-kind scheme. That is 
often convenient for patients, and the directive does not wish to discourage it. 
However, it has nothing to do with the right that a patient has when he does in fact go 
to a non-contracted foreign healthcare provider. 
Conclusion on Article 7(1) 
                                                      
12
 It is also worth noting that the understanding of benefits proposed in this opinion is also the one used by the 
Netherlands’ government in Müller-Fauré. In that case the Netherlands’ government argued, unsuccessfully, that 
to allow such patients to be reimbursed would ‘extend the conditions in which benefits are awarded’ (paragraph 
51). It did not argue that it would ‘extend the type of benefits’. Rather it appeared to understand ‘benefits’ in the 
normal sense, as types of medical care, not by reference to the type of supplier. 
12. The most plausible meaning of Article 7(1), given the text, its context in the directive, 
the purpose of the directive, and its stated relationship to the case law, and the 
relationship of Article 7(1) to similar phrases in other legislation and case law, is that 
it requires Member States to ensure that if a Dutch patient would be entitled to 
undergo a certain kind of medical treatment in the Netherlands, within their insurance, 
then they must receive reimbursement for the same or similar kind of medical 
treatment received abroad. This can be stated, for the reasons above, with a high 
degree of certainty.  
 
13. It is worth perhaps noting that this is also the view which is being presented to the 
public by the European Commission,
13
 and by the United Kingdom.
14
 Along with the 
Netherlands, the UK has been the state most often in conflict with EU law in this 
field, and whose healthcare system faced the most fundamental shock as a result of 
patient mobility. Nevertheless, despite being a state usually quite prepared to take a 
strong stand on EU law if it feels it has a good case, the UK informs its own patients 
via the National Health Service website that the Directive allows them to receive non-
hospital care abroad as long as the treatment is of a kind that the NHS provides in the 
UK, and to have it reimbursed. The legal position of the Netherlands regarding the 
Directive – or perhaps one should say the legal position of the minister – appears to be 
entirely unique. 
Article 7(7) 
14. The Directive, like the case law, does not contain any absolute obligations. There are 
a number of sub-provisions nuancing the basic right to treatment abroad, but the most 
relevant here is Article 7(7) which provides that the same ‘conditions, criteria of 
eligibility and regulatory and administrative formalities’ may be imposed on foreign 
healthcare as on domestic. The only limit to this is that any such condition or 
formality must  not be  
…discriminatory or constitute an obstacle to the free movement of patients, 
services or goods, unless it is objectively justified by planning requirements 
relating to the object of ensuring sufficient and permanent access to a balanced 
range of high-quality treatments in the Member State concerned or to the wish 
to control costs and avoid, as far as possible, any waste of financial, technical 
and human resources. 
15. It could be argued that the nature of the benefits-in-kind policy means that the 
requirement that a provider have a prior contract with an insurer is a condition of 
payment for that healthcare which may then be extended to foreign healthcare. The 
question is then whether such a condition, and Article 13 ZvW which permits it, is 
discriminatory and/or justified. 
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16. It is arguably discriminatory, since in practice it has the effect of largely excluding 
foreign suppliers, and ensuring that most healthcare is provided domestically. 
However, it could also be argued that domestic non-contracted suppliers are just as 
harmed as foreign suppliers, so that discrimination is not a good description of the 
situation. 
 
17. Discrimination in European Union law is a notoriously slippery subject, upon which 
the Court is far from consistent. Thus while it is quite plausible that Article 7(7) 
would regard Article 13 ZvW as discriminatory and unlawful, it is not certain.  
What is certain, however, is that Article 13, by allowing restrictive policies, does 
create an obstacle to movement. In practice, it will be harder for patients to go abroad 
than to receive treatment in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, it may be argued that 
Article 13 is part of a policy which aims to promote planning, control costs, and avoid 
wastage, and that these goals are sufficient to justify its consequences. If such an 
argument was successful it would make Article 13 lawful. 
18. It is important here to disentangle the policy argument from the legal one. Whether or 
not the policy of the proposed health insurance law is good healthcare policy, and 
does in fact contribute to planning, cost control etc is undoubtedly something about 
which healthcare experts could argue at length. However, Article 7(7) cannot be read 
as simply deferring to national policy goals, for that would render it ineffective law. 
By contrast, the legal question is how it would be understood by the Court of Justice, 
as the body authorised to provide definitive interpretations of Union law.  
 
19. Here we are helped considerably by the fact that precisely these questions have 
already arisen in a series of cases, several involving the Netherlands.
15
 In these the 
Court has recognised that planning, cost control and prevention of wastage are 
legitimate goals, and can, to some extent, be used to justify restrictions on free 
movement. However, it has also found that there are limits to such justification. In 
particular, it has found that while restrictions on hospital (intra-mural) care may often 
be justified by these reasons, restrictions on non-hospital (extra-mural) care cannot be. 
Indeed, Müller-Fauré and Watts both concerned benefits-in-kind systems similar to 
the one proposed by the new health insurance law, in which out-of-system care was 
not covered. The policy arguments which the Dutch government might put forward in 
favour of Article 13, concerning planning, cost, and wastage, were put forward in 
those cases by the Dutch and British governments respectively, and accepted in 
respect of hospital care, and rejected in the case of non-hospital care.  
 
20. Given that the Court has already addressed the question of which justifications can be 
accepted and to what extent in these (and other) cases, and given that the directive 
codifies the case law, I cannot think of any reason why Article 7(7) would now 
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suddenly be read in a new way, to allow extended justifications for restrictions on free 
movement. On the contrary, it seems very clear that, as Article 8 of the Directive 
provides, a somewhat restrictive regime for hospital care is permissible, but, as 
Article 7(1) suggests, for non-hospital care the presumption is of patient choice. Were 
new factors to arise in the future which change the cost and waste entailed in patient 
mobility, even for non-hospital care, that might perhaps change the position, although 
it should be noted that the Court is generally very reluctant to allow the scope of 
rights to be reduced once they have been established. 
 
21. Prima facie, therefore, the policy justifications which might be put forward for Article 
13 would be rejected, since they have already been put forward in other cases, and 
were rejected in those, and nothing has changed. 
The existence of the restitution policy 
22. The minister has expressed the view that the situation is importantly different from 
that in Müller-Fauré, because of the existence of the restitution policy.
16
 The existence 
of both types of policy alongside each other means that patients do in fact have the 
option of insurance for foreign healthcare, but also have the option, if they wish, of 
saving money by opting for a more restrictive insurance package which limits them to 
certain providers. Her understanding of the situation is that rather than the 
Netherlands depriving individuals of their right to foreign healthcare, it simply offers 
them the option whether they wish to exercise that right in practice, or would rather 
save some money. 
This is a novel and interesting argument, which is nevertheless entirely wrong and 
without much chance of success. 
23. Legally, it misses the point. It is more of a policy argument than a legal one. The 
Directive is quite clear that all patients have the right to reimbursement for foreign 
treatment, not just those who have made an earlier choice to opt for a certain kind of 
policy. In fact, the Directive phrases the situation in terms of the obligations of states 
and insurers, rather than the rights of patients. The obligation on the Netherlands is to 
ensure reimbursement in accordance with Article 7. There is nothing in the Directive 
which provides for some limitation of that obligation to certain groups of patients. 
Such a limitation would in substance be a derogation from the principle of free 
movement, and cannot be imposed unless there is a basis in the Directive or Treaty for 
it. There is not. The existence of the restitution policy is legally quite irrelevant to the 
rights of a patient with a benefits-in-kind policy, who continues to enjoy Treaty and 
Directive rights as expressed in those documents.  
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24. A practical reason why the minister’s argument would not be accepted can further be 
found in the consequences that it would have. It is envisaged that most patients will 
have benefits-in-kind policies. In practice, her view would mean that most Dutch 
patients would not enjoy patient mobility to any serious extent. That would render the 
Directive pointless. European Union law is always interpreted in the light of its goals, 
and even where there some provision in the directive which provided a hint of support 
for the minister’s view (which there is not), the teleological approach of the Court 
would prevent it taking such a restrictive approach. 
 
25. It appears that what the minister imagines is some sort of waiver of rights. The 
implicit suggestion is that patients may choose to enjoy full mobility rights, but may 
also, in return for financial advantage (reduced premiums) give up those rights. Such 
issues come up regularly in employment law in some states, and for example in the 
UK the government has proposed allowing employees to give up certain employment 
protection rights in return for a lump-sum payment. Such rules are always 
controversial, because they undermine rights which are part of broader public policy – 
about creating a certain kind of society – and because there is always the doubt 
whether the party waiving their rights really appreciates the consequences at the time 
of consent, and whether that consent is ‘genuine’ enough. The party consenting to a 
waiver of rights is almost always the weaker in the negotiation, which is why waivers 
are often not allowed. In general, the more fundamental the right the less likely it is 
that contractual waivers will be allowed by law.  
 
26. Waivers of free movement rights has not arisen to my knowledge in European Union 
law, but suggested waivers of other rights have come before the Court of Justice, 
including in cases in which the Netherlands was involved.
17
 The waiver of certain 
employment rights in a directive (in return for financial advantage), the waiver of the 
right of illegal third-country immigrants not to be detained in prisons with ordinary 
prisons, and, most relevantly, the waiver of certain rights to medical care within 
regulation 1408/71 (in return for exemption from certain premiums) have all been 
considered. In each case it was argued that (i) the individual had consented to the 
waiver and (ii) it was in their own interests: migrant workers did not want to pay 
premiums for a right that they might not use, some illegal immigrants actually 
preferred to be detained in prisons because they had more contact with their 
compatriots there, and the employed persons received compensatory benefits so that 
their overall position was not worse. 
 
27. Nevertheless, the waiver argument was rejected in each case. While the facts are all 
quite complex, the principles of the rejection are consistent in all the cases, and 
emerge quite clearly from the judgments: 
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i. The European Union law in question was compulsory and did not allow for 
derogation. If rights and obligations are contained in European Union law it is 
not open to Member States to unilaterally conclude contracts with individuals 
which deprive them of those rights. 
ii. The consent in question cannot be accepted as justification for a different 
view. At the time when an individual agrees to give up certain rights, or not to 
enforce certain EU law rights, they may not fully appreciate the consequences, 
and their decision may be taken under some form of pressure or duress.  
iii. As a matter of principle, the concept of a waiver of rights assumes that only 
the interests of the parties are at stake. However, EU rights are a matter of 
public policy, and it is of concern to the EU as a whole that rights contained in 
its law are enforced throughout the EU and granted to all individuals.  
 
28. These principles translate very well to the current situation.  
i. The Directive imposes obligations, and Member States may therefore not 
conclude or authorise contracts with individuals which allow escape from 
those obligations. 
ii. Once a year a patient is permitted to change insurer. When they do so in 
November or December they do not know what may happen to them in March 
or April, and what treatment they will need. The time at which a patient needs 
to take a decision about where they wish to receive treatment is when the 
treatment is necessary, not at some earlier point. Moreover, the reality is that 
for many people the difference in premium between restitution and benefits-
in-kind policies will make it difficult for them not to choose the latter, 
particularly since insurers will no doubt tell them that they are excellently 
insured. Only later may they come to regret this. 
iii. There is a public policy issue involved. It is not only the interests of patients 
and insurers at stake, but of foreign healthcare providers’, and indeed of the 
EU as a whole. The policy of free movement of services, and of the directive, 
is to create a single market for services, including healthcare services, in 
which patients are free to move throughout the EU for healthcare, with the 
consequence of improvements in quality and availability of healthcare 
throughout the EU. Member States cannot take action that is without regard to 
this policy and the interests of foreign healthcare providers. To do so would be 
to fundamentally misunderstand the nature of the internal market, and indeed 
membership of the EU. 
It may be noted that forms of this argument are often considered by academics 
to underly a great deal of free movement law. The conditions under which 
individuals may buy, sell and receive goods and services, including public 
services, are not, contrary to the occasional behaviour of Member States, a 
purely national matter. The Union interest in removing borders and creating a 
single market is always implicit in the law and should be integrated into 
national rules. 
 
29. In conclusion, the suggestion of the minister that individual rights to enjoy free 
movement of services in the medical sphere may be ‘bought off’ by reduced premium 
does not fit the letter of the law, nor its broader policy. It is without any serious 
chance of success. 
 
The publication by Van de Gronden 
30. One of the first people to signal that there were legal problems with the proposed 
Article 13 was Johan van de Gronden, Professor of EU law at Radboud University 
Nijmegen. He argued in the Dutch Journal of Health Law that Article 13 represented 
an incorrect implementation of the Directive, for reasons compatible with, and often 
similar to, those outlined above in this opinion.
18
 I agree in substance with his 
conclusions on the unlawfulness of Article 13. 
 
His publication is worth mentioning specifically for the following reasons: as one of 
the Netherland’s leading experts in this field, and indeed someone who enjoys an 
international reputation in the field of EU health regulation, his publication was 
widely read and discussed, and was brought specifically to the attention of the 
minister soon after it was published in early 2013. Because of the seriousness of his 
arguments and the issues he raised, she chose to respond publicly to his claim that 
Article 13 was unlawful in a written answer to the Dutch Lower House.
19
 In her 
answer she also notes that the European Commission had indicated that a benefits-in-
kind policy which restricted access to foreign care, and made reimbursement 
conditional upon a prior contract between foreign provider and insurer, would be 
contrary to the Directive and Treaty. 
 
Nevertheless, the minister took the view that both Van de Gronden and the European 
Commission had misunderstood the law. 
 
31. The minister’s answer revolves around whether the directive requires non-contracted 
foreign care to be reimbursed  
a. as if it were non-contracted domestic care (i.e. not reimbursed), or  
b. whether it should be reimbursed as if it were contracted domestic care (i.e. 
according to a tariff based on the fees paid to contracted domestic suppliers).  
Van de Gronden had provided a detailed analysis of this question, showing how the 
Court responds to contract-based healthcare systems, and explaining why the second 
view, b, was correct. (This opinion above provides further reasons
20
). He had noted 
that the government took a different view, and had explained at some length why he 
disagreed. 
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32. If the minister had substantive reasons why his arguments were wrong, this would 
have been an appropriate moment to mention them. She did not however engage with 
his criticisms, but instead offered three ‘reasons’ for maintaining her view, all very 
unsatisfactory. 
 
33. First, she just repeated her assertion that Article 7 allows view (a) above. She did not 
address any of the reasons provided by Van de Gronden why this assertion was 
wrong. This part of her answer offers no new content, and is essentially just an 
unreasoned confirmation of her position. 
 
34. Secondly, she argued that recital number 4 of the Directive supported her view. This 
provides that the Directive … ‘should not result in patients being encouraged to 
receive healthcare outside their Member State…’ She claimed that if a non-contracted 
foreign provider received more reimbursement than a non-contracted domestic 
provider this would amount to such encouragement. 
 
35. This is entirely incorrect. If the cost of foreign treatment is reimbursed as if it were 
domestic contracted treatment then the decision to go abroad or stay at home is 
financially neutral, which is not an encouragement to go abroad. Patients stand to 
make no profit at all by going abroad (which they never do, as reimbursement is never 
obliged to exceed actual costs), and would presumably do so only in the event that 
they had some medical or personal reason for wishing to. It is the benefits-in-kind 
policy which actively discourages foreign treatment, and the possibility for 
reimbursement which essentially takes national borders out of the equation, to an 
extent, so that decisions about medical treatment are made on substance, and the 
patient is not pushed in any particular direction or other. This is not encouragement to 
go abroad. The minister appears to misunderstand not just the EU law, but how the 
domestic law would work. 
 
36. In any case, this issue is not what recital 4 is intended to address. There is a policy 
concern that the possibility of patient migration might lead Member States to stop 
investment in healthcare, on the basis that certain kinds of expensive facilities can 
always be accessed abroad. It is considered desirable that Member States maintain 
adequate domestic facilities, so that patients always have the possibility of receiving 
treatment at home, and are never pushed abroad. Recital 4 is about ensuring that good 
health care is, as far as possible, available locally, and free movement cannot be used 
to allow Member States to evade the obligation to ensure this. If insurers were to 
conclude bulk contract with foreign suppliers, for example, at the expense of domestic 
ones (because the foreign ones were cheaper, for example), so that Dutch patients 
with benefits-in-kind policies who lived in certain areas were told that they must go 
for certain operations to Germany or Belgium, this would be contrary to the intent of 
recital 4. The minister’s invocation of it as a justification for the refusal to pay for 
foreign treatment is however without logic or legal basis. 
 
37. The final ‘argument’ that the minister put forward was that the Directive aimed to 
give patients’ clarity about reimbursement of foreign treatment, and the new policy 
was entirely consistent with this, as it was now quite clear that those with benefits-in-
kind policies would not receive reimbursement for care from any non-contracted 
providers. 
 
38. This argument of the minister is just an irrelevance; yes, the new Article 13 is 
certainly clear, but the fact that the Directive aims to achieve clarity does not mean 
that any law which is clear is therefore compatible with it. The Directive aims to 
achieve clarity, but it repeats in various places that the reason for this is because 
clarity about rights and obligations facilitates free movement.
21
 A law which clearly 
makes cross-border care impossible for most Dutch patients is not using clarity in the 
way that the Directive envisages. 
 
39. At the end of her answer, the minister then develops certain policy arguments about 
the new insurance law. These are not related to its legality.  
 
40. The minister does not, therefore, provide any substantive response to Van de 
Gronden, offering two very very weak arguments (about clarity and recital 4) and then 
simply reiterating without reasons a standpoint which he had already discussed and 
dismissed at length. The conclusion must be that the government does not have any 
reasons to believe in the legality of Article 13 other than those weak reasons which 
have been put forward already, and had already been dismissed by Van de Gronden 
(and are further critiqued in this opinion). This will be very relevant in the event that 
Article 13 is in fact adopted and an action for compensation for breach of EU law is 
pursued against the Dutch state. 
 
41. With respect to the opinion of the European Commission, the minister’s response was 
that the Commission had not been aware that people could also choose for a 
restitution policy. Therefore their opinion was based on incomplete information. For 
the reasons given above in this opinion,
22
 I see no reason to think that the 
Commission’s response would have been any different had it been aware of this, nor 
that the existence of the restitution policy makes any difference.  
 
C. COMPATIBILITY OF ARTICLE 13 WITH THE CASE LAW OF THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 
 
1. As will have been apparent from the above, the Court has had several opportunities to 
consider benefits-in-kind healthcare schemes, in the Netherlands and other Member 
States, and patients who nevertheless wish to go abroad. Despite the fact that such 
migration fits very uncomfortably with the nature of the schemes – as it would fit 
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uncomfortably with the envisaged Dutch healthcare system – the Court has 
nevertheless found that Member States are obliged to reimburse foreign care. Article 
13 is clearly incompatible with this case law, and this does not in fact appear to be 




2. Rather, the position of the minister appears to be that it is no longer necessary to 
consider the case law now that the directive has been adopted, as this is now the 
relevant legal framework and renders the case law obsolete.
24
 
That is a fundamental misunderstanding of European Union law. All the rights 
articulated in the case law of the Court continue to have full effect, and to be fully 
applicable, quite independently of the directive. 
3. Where the Treaty creates directly effective rights – as is the case with patient mobility 
– the direct effect of those rights is not affected by the adoption of secondary 
legislation. If the legislation is comprehensive it may no longer be necessary to refer 
to the Treaty directly, as the lex specialis rule indicates that the first point of call 
should be the legislation, and this may solve all legal problems. However, if there are 
gaps or ambiguities, then the Treaty will continue to be relevant and applicable, either 
for guiding the interpretation of the legislation, or in providing rights which the 
legislation does not provide. It is very common that even after the adoption of 
secondary legislation, often based on case law, Treaty rights continue to be litigated 
and successfully relied upon. The citizenship directive,
25
 and regulation 1408/71, now 
regulation 883/2004, provide examples of this. 
 
4. Indeed, regulation 1408/71 was, until recently, the primary legislative framework for 
cross-border healthcare, governing when treatment abroad should be provided and 
reimbursed, and by whom. This did not stop the Court from developing an entirely 
independent and parallel regime of patients’ rights on the basis of free movement of 
services, and it is now the case that the regulation, now replaced by regulation 
883/2004, must be applied alongside the Treaty rights, with both often applicable in a 





5. Although the Directive is now in force, the Treaty rights also continue to be, and if the 
Directive fails to provide a right in a circumstance where the Treaty does – according 
to the case law of the Court – then a patient is entirely free to rely on the Treaty 
directly to enforce that right.  
 
                                                      
23
 It is emphasized in the documents cited above in notes 2 and 16 above  that the government takes the view 




 Directive 2004/38. 
26 See Case C-368/98 Vanbraekel. 
6. Partly for this reason I think it unlikely that the Court will interpret the Directive to 
mean anything different from its case law. However, even if the Directive does turn 
out to be in some sense a more limited regime of rights, the more extensive rights 
found in the Treaty continue to exist and be applicable in national courts and legal 
systems. 
Thus even if – which is unlikely – Article 7(1) only provides rights to healthcare from 
contracted foreign suppliers, so that the Directive is in fact essentially a procedural 
document, concerning a limited range of healthcare but addressing the practicalities 
and formalities surrounding it, that would in no way mean that the broader right to 
non-hospital healthcare from a supplier of choice, as articulated in the case law, has 
ceased to exist. 
7. If this seems surprising to a national lawyer or politician it may be a failure to 
appreciate the specific and narrow role of the EU legislature. It is not, unlike a 
national parliament, able to make policy and law pursuing all the goals and ambitions 
which may contribute to a ‘good life’. Rather, it is confined to legislation which 
pursues the specifically articulated goals of the EU. It is essentially an implementor of 
the Treaty, whereas the meaning of the Treaty is the prerogative of the Court. As 
such, secondary legislation is hierarchically inferior to the Treaty, and takes place 
within its framework, and therefore within the interpretations of the Treaty which the 
Court provides. In the context of EU law the Court, interpreting the Treaty, provides 
the frame within which the legislature must operate, rather than the other way round. 
Hence the repeated references in legislation to the Court’s case law and the ubiquitous 




1. In Müller-Fauré, as in other cases, the Court stated that 
First, achievement of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty 
inevitably requires Member States to make some adjustments to their national 
systems of social security. It does not follow that this would undermine their 
sovereign powers in this field. 
One may doubt the complete coherence of this statement. Nevertheless, it represents 
the law. Member States may choose how to construct healthcare systems, but are 
required to do so in a way respecting EU law, and that law may in fact impose real 
restrictions on them, forcing them to abandon plans which they might otherwise have 
pursued, and to adjust policies.  
2. In the context of the internal market, and the free movement of services, Member 
States are legally required to ensure that their healthcare systems actually, as a matter 
of fact, make it possible for insured persons to go abroad for healthcare, albeit that 
where hospital care is concerned some limitations apply. This is not some exercise in 
formal anti-discrimination, a policy that can be complied with by clever linguistics, 
but a substantive demand which will be, as is always the case, substantively tested by 
the Court. The real question is, in practice, can people in the Netherlands actually 
make use of the wide range of healthcare providers in the EU, or, in practice, do 
features of their system keep them at home? 
 
3. It is quite clear what the answer to this question would be if Article 13 were to be 
adopted. For the reasons above in this opinion it is contrary to EU law.  
 
- It fails to comply with the Directive, in particular Article 7(1);  
- the possible justifications which might be put forward have already been considered 
and rejected in earlier caselaw; 
- it is incompatible with the Treaty itself, which continues to be the highest legal 
authority, quite independently of the Directive. 
 
4. None of the arguments apparently put forward by the minister cast any doubt on this 
conclusion.  
 
- The suggested reading of Article 7(1) shows no awareness of the legal context, and 
does not even fit the text;  
- the proposal that as long as two different kinds of policy exist the law is not infringed 
makes no legal sense, and case law provides good reasons why it would be rejected. 
 
5. Finally, perhaps most importantly, there appears to be an underlying perception that 
the Netherlands can design its healthcare in relative isolation from wider EU policy, 
and then defend it on narrow technical grounds, such as a lack of formal 
discrimination. This displays a lack of legal understanding of how EU law works. On 
the contrary, the fundamental, underlying, test which will be applied is whether the 
Netherlands policy contributes to the creation of a borderless single market, and to 
patient mobility, or whether it detracts from that policy. There can be little doubt that 
in significantly reducing the opportunities for treatment abroad for most Dutch 
patients the government has chosen a path incompatible with their legal obligations. 
Consequences 
6. If Article 13 were to be adopted, there would be an obligation on all Dutch courts and 
public authorities to treat it as non-applicable: to essentially ignore it, and to apply the 
substantive rights in the Treaty and Directive instead.
27
 Formal adoption by the Dutch 
parliament would not be enough to give it binding force in the Netherlands. The view 
of the Court is that EU law takes precedence over national law, and that Member 
States have surrendered the power to legislate contrary to EU law. Where they appear 
to do so, that legislation must be set aside by all courts and authorities. A court in 
doubt, or uncomfortable about setting Article 13 aside, could of course refer the 
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question to the Court of Justice, but no judge, properly informed, could reasonably 
take the view that the revised Article 13 is enforceable law and leave the matter there. 
 
7. In practice, a patient with a benefits-in-kind policy who received treatment abroad, 
sought reimbursement, and was refused it, would face two possibilities. They could 
sue the insurer directly for that reimbursement, and whether or not this succeeded 
would depend on the legal doctrine known as horizontal direct effect. It is open to 
argument whether this path would succeed, (although I think it likely that it would) 
and I am not asked to go into the question in more detail here. 
However, if it was not successful, because the Treaty and directive were not held to 
be enforceable directly against private insurers, then the patient would be able to 
claim compensation from the Dutch state for a breach of EU law, in failing to 
implement the Directive properly and/or to respect the Treaty. Given the clarity of the 
law, such a claim should be successful. 
8. Furthermore, it seems very likely that in the event Article 13 were adopted by the 
Dutch parliament that the Commission would begin an enforcement action against the 
Netherlands, which could, ultimately, lead to a fine being imposed, if the Article were 
not removed from the law or amended quickly enough. 
 
 
Hoogachtend 
 
 
Gareth Davies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
